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The European Union–China relationship, based on an optimistic joint stra-
tegic agenda agreed in 2013, has shifted direction, with the EU in March 
2019 describing China as a “systemic rival” in some areas. The EU has strug-
gled to find a common approach to China, but this change was agreed at 
record speed and occurred against the background of growing United States 
pressure on its European allies to support the Donald Trump administra-
tion’s hard-line approach to China. As the new EU leadership team takes 
over, it will have to navigate a difficult path in relations with China and 
the US.
 •  The main reason for the shift in the EU’s approach was business frustration at 
China’s failure over many years to implement promises to open up its economy 
and accept a level playing field. Chinese foot-dragging in the negotiations for 
a bilateral investment agreement, now running for over six years, was another 
factor in the changed EU approach. 
 • A number of key players, including commissioners dealing with China, mem-
bers of the European Parliament, and EU ambassadors who had served in Bei-
jing, played a key role in securing this changed approach, which was agreed 
very quickly despite some long-standing divisions between member states on 
how to deal with China. 
 • Pressure from the Trump administration – which, unlike the EU, views China 
as a “strategic rival” – also played a part. It is likely that the new EU leadership 
under Ursula von der Leyen will maintain the tougher line, and place greater 
emphasis on reciprocity and strategic autonomy as guidelines for dealing with 
China.
 • Meanwhile there is continuing useful cooperation between the EU and China 
on the foreign policy front, notably on Iran, and on global issues such as climate 
change and support for the multilateral trading system.
Policy Implications
The EU has to invest more in understanding China, which is a growing and for-
midable rival. EU leaders need to spend more time discussing China and agree-
ing a comprehensive approach covering all sectors. It should work with like-
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False Hopes 
Many observers, including the Chinese authorities, were surprised that European 
Union leaders agreed in March 2019 a document labelling the Asian country “a sys-
temic rival […] promoting alternative models of governance” (European Commis-
sion 2019a). From the accession of China to the World Trade Organization in 2001 
up until the election of Xi Jinping as General Secretary in 2012, the EU hoped that 
China’s increasing global exposure would gradually lead to a market economy and 
more democratic political system. Mentioning the need for “reciprocity” was seen 
as a pretext for protectionist measures. 
Six years after President Xi started his tenure, in 2019, the EU stated it needed 
“a more realistic, assertive, and multi-faceted approach to ensure that relations 
with China were fair, balanced, and mutually beneficial” (European Commission 
2019a). This should involve not just trade, investment, maritime security, and hu-
man rights, but industrial and competition policy, procurement, data, and con-
nectivity. As Reinhard Bütikofer, the new chair of the European Parliament’s (EP) 
Delegation for Relations with China, told the author: “The penny seems to have 
dropped that China will not be moving towards a liberal democratic society and 
market economy anytime soon.”
This new robust approach followed years of mostly unsuccessful EU pressure 
on China at summits and ministerial meetings to open its markets, refrain from 
intellectual property theft, stop enforced technology transfers, and accept interna-
tional debt, labour, and environmental standards in the construction of infrastruc-
ture projects. It has taken the EU almost two decades to reach this position, a period 
many would characterise as marked by ignorance, naiveté, and division on the EU 
side. The EU had too few China experts; many believed that it would become more 
liberal as it became richer; and member states were divided on how to deal with 
China. EU divisions are exemplified by the regular meetings between a mix of 16 
member and non-member states from the Western Balkans with China. Started in 
2012, the annual summits continue even though there has been little to show in 
terms of new trade and investment. This year Greece joined the group, which is now 
known as 17+1 (Kavalski 2019).
It remains to be seen how the EU will implement the new approach. Much will 
depend on the outcome of the current bilateral investment treaty negotiations that 
have been dragging on for six years now. The Chinese attitude to WTO reform will 
also be critical, as this entails discussion of e-commerce, data protection, and in-
dustrial subsidies. An unpredictable factor further complicating Sino–European 
cooperation on reforming the WTO, in whose survival both trading blocs have an 
unambiguous interest, is the ongoing United States–China trade negotiations. The 
conclusion of a deal resolving the trade conflict would further weaken the role of 
the WTO in regulating global trade, potentially encouraging China to double down 
on its approach to strike bilateral (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI) deals with trading 
partners instead. 
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China’s Rise
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU and China in 1975 
there has been a steady shift in the balance of the relationship. In the first two dec-
ades thereafter, economic leverage was overwhelmingly on the EU side. But this 
began to change with the admission of China to the WTO in 2001, a move that had 
been supported strongly by the EU. Since then the economic balance has steadily 
shifted in China’s favour, and it has re-emerged as a major global power – arguably 
one of the most fundamental geopolitical changes of the past half-century. 
Between 1995 and 2006, the EU issued several communications on China – 
largely welcoming its economic development, offering advice on numerous issues, 
and stressing the opportunities for mutual cooperation. In 2003, China issued a 
policy paper on the EU – the first time it had issued a foreign policy document cov-
ering a specific region or country. It was remarkably positive in tone, stressing the 
benefits that EU integration had brought to the continent and the wider world. The 
same year both sides agreed on a comprehensive strategic partnership, and in 2013 
an ambitious “2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” was launched (EEAS 2013). 
In April 2014, China issued its second policy paper on the EU – again stressing 
that it viewed the latter as a key strategic and cooperation partner, but warning the 
supranational body not to interfere in its core interests including Taiwan and Tibet 
(China Daily 2014). That year, President Xi made a visit to the EU’s institutions – 
praising the importance of the relationship based on annual summits, started in 
1998, high-level dialogues on foreign and economic policy, and people-to-people 
exchanges, as well as on consultations in more than 60 different fields. These dia-
logues vary in frequency and substance, but neither side has expressed a desire to 
reduce them.
The EP, often a critic of the EU’s policy vis-à-vis China, has regular exchanges 
with the National People’s Congress, and there are many links between the vari-
ous political groups in the EP and Chinese politicians. In July 2019 the Parliament 
passed a highly critical resolution on China’s handling of the pro-democracy dem-
onstrations in Hong Kong, prompting an unusually sharp response from Beijing 
(Euractiv 2019). In addition to the official dialogues, there are also countless aca-
demic, think tank, and business conferences as well as people-to-people exchanges. 
Cooperation has grown in almost every sector from foreign and security policy, 
customs and finance, to agriculture, science and technology, energy, ocean govern-
ance, tourism, and culture and education. China and the EU have also cooperated 
well on the Iran nuclear deal and within the United Nations Contact Group on Pi-
racy off the coast of Somalia. There has also been increased cooperation on Afghani-
stan, North Korea, the Middle East, and Africa.
Trade and Investment
But it is trade and investment that are at the heart of the relationship. The EU is 
China’s biggest trade partner, while the latter is the former’s second-largest one. 
Trade in goods amounts to EUR 1.5 billion each day. The EU exported EUR 198 
billion of goods to China in 2017, and took EUR 375 billion in return. On services, 
the EU had a surplus exporting EUR 45 billion and taking EUR 28 billion in return. 
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Like the US, the EU has complained about the trade deficit, but until 2019 did not 
take decisive action on it. 
There has been a transformation in the investment field. For many years Eu-
ropean companies invested heavily in China, with stocks reaching over EUR 100 
billion in 2014. Two years later Chinese investment in the EU outpaced European 
investment in the Asian country for the first time, marking a dramatic shift in eco-
nomic performance, and leading to concern about the implications of China target-
ing specific industrial sectors. In 2018, however, Chinese foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the EU fell by 40 per cent to EUR 17.3 billion compared to 2017 levels, and 
down over 50 per cent from peak levels in 2016 (DG Trade 2019). Most Chinese 
investment has traditionally targeted the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, 
leaving the 12 EU member states participating in the aforementioned 17+1 format 
increasingly frustrated (MERICS 2019).
The Change in the EU’s Attitude
The change in the EU’s attitude came about after many years of frustration that 
China had not followed through on promises to move towards a level playing field as 
regards trade and investment. Repeatedly voiced European concerns about lack of 
market access, unfair procurement rules, intellectual property theft, and enforced 
technology transfers for joint ventures went unanswered (Geeraerts 2019). 
An important event was the publication of the influential German federal in-
dustrialists’ association (BDI) paper in January 2019 pointing to past failures and 
arguing for a new approach based on reciprocity. The BDI called for a strengthened 
economic policy framework for the EU single market, arguing that Chinese firms 
should have to accept the liberal market economy regulations of the supranational 
body if they want to be active in Europe (BDI 2019). The umbrella European busi-
ness organisation (Business Europe) would also urge a more assertive approach 
having received critical feedback from its members. The business lobbying had an 
impact on those commissioners dealing with trade, investment, competition, and 
industrial policy. A number of MEPs – including Jo Leinen, the former head of the 
Delegation for Relations with China – also argued for a tougher approach towards 
the Asian country.
In addition to business lobbying, there were concerns about China’s behaviour 
in the South China Sea, with it disrespecting the ruling of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration in The Hague vis-à-vis territorial claims. Concerns about the BRI 
not following international norms on transparency and sustainability were equally 
widespread. The US also applied pressure on the EU and its member states not to 
accept Huawei technology, and not to support the BRI. According to one senior EU 
official, “the US position was pretty blunt – you are either with us or against us in 
dealing with China.”
As a result of these developments, in March 2019 the European Commission 
(EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) issued a new policy paper 
in advance of the European Council proposing that the EU should pursue three 
objectives:
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 • Deepen its engagement with China to promote common interests at the global 
level;
 • Robustly seek more balanced and reciprocal conditions governing the econom-
ic relationship;
 • Adapt to changing economic realities and strengthen the EU’s own domestic 
policies and industrial base.
The paper argued that given China’s economic power it should no longer be regard-
ed as a developing country. As a key global actor and leading technological power, 
its increasing presence in the world – including in Europe – should be accompanied 
by greater responsibilities for upholding the rules-based international order, as well 
as greater reciprocity, non-discrimination, and openness in its political system. 
China’s publicly stated reform ambitions should translate into policies or actions 
commensurate with its role and responsibilities (European Commission 2019a).
Partner and Rival
The paper emphasised that China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas 
“a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negoti-
ating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic 
competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promot-
ing alternative models of governance” (European Commission 2019a). It was this 
phrase “systemic rival” that captured the headlines, as the EU had never used such 
language before about any strategic partner. The paper was by no means a frontal 
attack on China: it merely sought to provide a balanced assessment of the relation-
ship.
It welcomed China’s support for the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate 
change agreement, but criticised it for financing so many coal-fired power stations 
under the BRI. It also appreciated China’s role in counter-piracy operations in the 
Gulf of Aden, in pressing for the denuclearisation of North Korea, and in supporting 
peace efforts in Afghanistan. Continuing, it then stated that China’s support of mul-
tilateralism was “sometimes selective and based on a different understanding of the 
rules-based international order” (European Commission 2019a). It acknowledged 
China’s progress on economic and social rights, but equally criticised the situation 
of the Muslim minority in Xinjiang and the continuing crackdown on human rights 
lawyers and defenders. 
The paper also acknowledged that Chinese investments abroad had contributed 
to economic development, but often neglected socio-economic and financial sus-
tainability as well as good governance. Furthermore, European companies faced the 
lack of a level playing field when competing in third countries’ markets, with Chi-
nese companies enjoying access to state-backed loans and export credits at prefer-
ential terms – applying corporate and labour standards rather different from mul-
tilateral ones. According to the EC’s trade department, China maintains the highest 
number of identified market access barriers among EU partners.
In the economic sphere, the paper proposed changing the EU’s approach as a 
result of China’s proactive and state-driven industrial and economic policies. An 
example hereof is “Made in China 2025,” which aims at developing domestic cham-
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pions and helping them to become global leaders in strategic high-tech sectors such 
as artificial intelligence, pharmaceuticals, and information technology. This is part 
of efforts to upgrade China’s manufacturing capabilities across the board. The paper 
furthermore suggested that WTO reform and the rapid conclusion of the bilateral 
investment agreement negotiations would be key issues in judging China’s willing-
ness to accept a more balanced and reciprocal economic relationship.
The paper concluded by pointing to the need to pay more attention to China, 
to work together, and to strengthen the EU’s own domestic policies and industrial 
base. It then invited the EC to endorse the following 10 actions:
1. Strengthen cooperation with China across all three pillars of the UN Charter: 
human rights, peace and security, and development;
2. Press China to peak its emissions before 2030, in line with the goals of the Paris 
Agreement;
3. Deepen engagement on peace and security, building on the positive coopera-
tion on Iran;
4. Work with China to promote international standards in their respective con-
nectivity strategies;
5. Call on China to deliver on existing joint EU–China commitments, including 
reforming the WTO (in particular on subsidies and forced technology transfers) 
and concluding bilateral agreements on investment by 2020;
6. Open up procurement opportunities in China by acceding to the International 
Procurement Instrument by the end of 2019;
7. Take into account labour and environmental standards on the participation of 
foreign bidders and goods in the EU procurement market;
8. Change EU laws to deal with the distortive effects of foreign state ownership 
and state financing in the internal market;
9. Develop a common EU approach to the security of 5G networks;
10. Implement swiftly the regulation on the screening of FDI to detect and raise 
awareness of security risks posed by foreign investment in critical assets, tech-
nologies, and infrastructure (European Commission 2019a).
The European Council, composed of the EU’s 28 national leaders, reacted favour-
ably to the Commission paper, adopting conclusions which stated that the EU needs 
to pursue a strategic course of action and increase its capacity to act autonomously 
to safeguard its interests, uphold its values and way of life, and help shape the global 
future. In a world where common rules and standards are increasingly questioned, 
it will be vital to promote a level playing field, including in the area of trade. This 
means ensuring fair competition within the EU and on the global stage, promot-
ing market access, fighting unfair practices, extraterritorial measures, and security 
risks from third countries (European Council 2019a).
China’s Reaction
China was taken aback by the change in the EU’s approach. As one diplomat at the 
Chinese mission to the EU remarked to the author, “we never expected that the EU 
would use such language against a strategic partner.” The mission was tasked with 
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ascertaining why this change occurred, as they had no forewarning. The ambas-
sador, speaking at a public event just a few days after the publication of the Com-
mission report, tried to make light of the “rival” tag by suggesting rivalry was for 
sporting opponents not two strategic partners cooperating on global affairs. The 
senior EU official dealing with China responded that while the supranational body 
valued the strategic partnership, it could no longer ignore the fact that the country 
had repeatedly failed to live up to summit commitments on the trade front. 
The Chinese media were also unsure how to respond to this tag. Initially there 
was pushback, criticising the EU for following President Trump. This was, however, 
followed by more nuanced commentary, acknowledging that major global actors 
sometimes had differences – although rivalry was not a good description of the 
EU–China relationship (China Daily 2019).
Officially, the Chinese had to recover quickly – as Premier Li Keqiang visited 
Brussels for the annual summit in early April 2019. Concerned not to have both 
the US and the EU as enemies concurrently, the Chinese delegation accepted fairly 
tough EU language in the communique. At the very last minute, the Chinese side 
agreed to a statement that committed the country to working on strengthening 
WTO rules on industrial subsidies, on further market access, and on concluding the 
bilateral investment treaty by 2020 (European Council 2019b).
The US Factor
In formulating its own policy towards China, the EU cannot ignore ongoing devel-
opments in the Sino–American relationship. The Trump administration labelled 
China a strategic rival in 2018, and has sought to enlist its allies in a containment 
policy towards China. The impact of US pressure has been mixed, with several mem-
ber states reflecting on whether to sign up to the BRI or to use Huawei technology. 
Italy notably disregarded US pressure and signed a memorandum of understanding 
on the BRI, concluded on the occasion of President Xi paying a visit to there earlier 
this year.
Most EU members are unwilling to engage in a US-led Cold War against China, 
especially given US tariffs on European industry and the unpopularity of President 
Trump. But there are longer-term, shared EU–US interests at stake which might be 
better protected by transatlantic cooperation as regards China. These include the 
importance of defending liberal democracy and the rule of law, as well as setting the 
rules for the next industrial revolution – covering sectors from big data, to artificial 
intelligence, to electric vehicles. 
But there are evident differences that suggest a transatlantic consensus on 
China will be difficult to forge. A growing number of Americans view China as a 
strategic rival seeking to reduce US power and influence both in Asia and elsewhere. 
Many US officials and experts now argue in favour of restricting contact with China 
in research, science and technology, and other sectors in order to protect the US’s 
position around the world. In contrast, the EU does not view China through a mili-
tary lens, and the majority view is to recognise the necessity of interdependence and 
to continue to engage with it across the board – albeit with eyes wide open.
There is a danger that any US decoupling from China would lead to a partial 
transatlantic one too. Some argue that the relatively free flow of technologies, capi-
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tal, components, and other critical aspects of the transatlantic economy cannot con-
tinue in the same way if one partner is substantially more open to China than the 
other. The effect in these circumstances would not just be a bifurcation – a China-
centred economic order and a Western-centred economic order – but outright frag-
mentation. The EU will do everything it can to avoid such a choice. Its most likely 
approach, therefore, will be to work with the US and other like-minded partners 
(Australia, Canada, Japan, etc.) on an ad hoc basis, building coalitions on different 
issues such as regulatory frameworks, infrastructure finance, and development aid.
In July 2019 the EU did suggest that it and the US should join forces in coun-
tering Chinese attempts to define the technologies of the future. As part of a pro-
gress report into EU–US co-operation on trade, the supranational body said that 
the “strategic case” for the two economies to work together on setting technical 
standards “has never been greater” – citing concerns about China’s attempts to in-
crease its influence in bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union 
and the International Organisation for Standardisation. Areas where EU–US coop-
eration appears promising, according to the report, include robotics, 3D printing, 
machinery for the oil and gas industry, and self-driving cars (European Commis-
sion 2019b).
No Magic Bullet
Moving forwards, there is no magic bullet in dealing with China. The EU has to 
recognise that it is dealing with a formidable rival with different values and aims. 
It needs a comprehensive approach to China, covering all sectors from trade and 
industrial policy to foreign and security policy plus human rights. Much will depend 
on whether the EU can make progress under its new leadership in delivering a more 
solid economic base that allows it to compete effectively with China, taking into 
account that the country’s economic, technological, military, and even ideological 
power are going to be far more central issues to deal with in the years ahead.
China should feature much more frequently on the agenda of the Foreign Af-
fairs Council and of the European Council. EU leaders must continue to sing from 
the same hymn sheet, as only a united EU can stand up to China. EU policymaking 
in the field of foreign and security policy should no longer be subject to unanimous 
agreement, but rather to a qualified majority vote – as unanimity has been used by 
some member states to block resolutions critical of China. 
Lastly, the EU should seek ways to work with the US and other partners on Chi-
na while protecting its own interests. For example, despite differences over WTO 
reform, it should be possible to identify a number of areas on the trade front – such 
as investment screening and security aspects of high-tech industries – where the 
EU could work with the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, and others. The EU could 
also do more on the maritime security front, especially in the South China Sea – by 
bolstering the capabilities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations states and 
encouraging efforts to agree a code of conduct. 
The EU could also partner with Japan on some connectivity projects to dem-
onstrate its commitment to the environmental and financial sustainability of infra-
structure ones. This would send a clear message to China about the importance of 
these principles. The fact that President Trump rarely mentions human rights has, 
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at least temporarily, deprived the EU of its main partner in promoting its norma-
tive agenda towards China. But there are other partners who share European liberal 
values, and so the EU should strengthen cooperation with them. 
References
BDI, The Voice of German Industry (2019), Strengthen the European Union 
to Better Compete with China, 10 January, https://english.bdi.eu/article/ne 
ws/strengthen-the-european-union-to-better-compete-with-china/ (8 October 
2019).
China Daily (2019), Editorial ‘EU Should Not Be Cowed into Toeing US Line’, 14 
March.
China Daily (2014), Full Text of China’s Policy Paper on EU, 2 April, www.chinadai 
ly.com.cn/world/cn_eu/2014-04/02/content_17401044.htm (6 October 2019).
DG Trade (2019), DG Trade Statistics, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/coun 
tries-and-regions/countries/china/ (8 October 2019).
EEAS see European External Action Service
Euractiv (2019), China Accuses EU Parliament of ‘Ignorance, Prejudice and Hy-
pocrisy’ over Hong Kong Stance, 19 July, www.euractiv.com/section/china/
news/china-accuses-eu-parliament-of-ignorance-prejudice-and-hypocrisy-over-
hong-kong-stance/ (8 October 2019).
European Commission (2019a), European Commission and HR/VP Contribution 
to the European Council: EU-China, A Strategic Outlook, 12 March. 
European Commission (2019b), EU-U.S. Trade Talks – One Year On, Commission 
Presents Progress Report, 25 July, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/in 
dex.cfm?id=2052 (8 October 2019).
European Council (2019a), European Council Conclusions, 22 March 2019, www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/22/european-council-
conclusions-22-march-2019/ (8 October 2019).
European Council (2019b), Joint Statement of the EU-China Summit of 9 April 
2019, 9 April, www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39020/euchina-joint-statement 
-9april2019.pdf (8 October 2019).
European External Action Service (2013), EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation, 27 November, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/
eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf (8 October 2019).
Geeraerts, G. (2019), The EU-China Partnership: Balancing between Divergence 
and Convergence, in: Asia Europe Journal, 7, 3, September.
Kavalski, E. (2019), China’s “16+1” Is Dead? Long Live the “17+1”, in: The Dip-
lomat, 29 March, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-161-is-dead-long-
live-the-171/ (8 October 2019). 
MERICS (2019), Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screen-
ing Policies, 6 March, www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/chinese-fdi-in-eu-
rope-2018 (8 October 2019).
   10    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 7 | OCTOBER 2019
The Author
Dr. Fraser Cameron is the director of the EU–Asia Centre, a Brussels-based think 
tank, and an associate at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies. He is a visiting profes-
sor at the Universities of Auckland, Xi’an, Fudan, and St Andrews, as well as at the 
Hertie School of Governance (Berlin). His research interests include the external 
relations of the EU and the geopolitics of Asia.
fc@eu-asiacentre.eu, www.eu-asiacentre.eu
Related GIGA Research
Researchers within GIGA Research Programme 3 “Growth and Development” 
(RP3) analyse macro-level socio-economic shifts by way of, for example, country 
comparisons in which the interdependence between long-term economic growth 
and structural change plays a key role. In RP3, research on Asian countries centres 
on analyses of economic transformation, advancements in innovation, and globali-
sation as seen from the perspective of both European and Asian actors.
Related GIGA Publications
Cameron Fraser (2017), “It’s Asia, Stupid”: Time for the EU to Deepen Relations 
with Asia, GIGA Focus Asia, 4, GIGA: Hamburg, www.giga-hamburg.de/de/sys-
tem/files/publications/gf_asien_1706_en.pdf.
Cameron, Fraser (2013), The Evolution of EU-Asia Relations: 2001-2011, in: Thom-
as Christiansen, Emil Kirchner, and Philomena B. Murray (eds), Palgrave Hand-
book of EU-Asia Relations, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 30–44.
Cameron, Fraser (2012), An Introduction to European Foreign Policy, Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge.
Köllner, Patrick (2016), Towards a Comprehensive Partnership between the EU 
and New Zealand, GIGA Focus Asia, 7, GIGA: Hamburg, www.giga-hamburg.de/
de/system/files/publications/gf_asien_1607_en.pdf.
Lang, Bertram, and Heike Holbig (2018), Civil Society Work in China: Trade-Offs 
and Opportunities for European NGOs, GIGA Focus Asia, 6, GIGA: Hamburg, 
www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_asien_1806.pdf.
Lenz, Tobias (2018), The European Union: A Model Under Pressure, GIGA Fo-
cus Global, 6, GIGA: Hamburg, www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publica-
tions/gf_global_1806_en.pdf.
Nolte, Detlef (2018), China Is Challenging but (Still) Not Displacing Europe in Lat-
in America, GIGA Focus Latin America, 1, GIGA: Hamburg, www.giga-hamburg.
de/de/system/files/publications/gf_lateinamerika_1801_en_0.pdf.
   11    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 7 | OCTOBER 2019 
Imprint
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the 
Internet and downloaded free of charge at www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-
focus. According to the conditions of the Creative Commons licence Attri-
bution-No Derivative Works 3.0 this publication may be freely duplicated, 
circulated and made accessible to the public. The particular conditions 
include the correct indication of the initial publication as GIGA Focus and 
no changes in or abbreviation of texts.
The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies – Leibniz-Institut für Globale und 
Regionale Studien in Hamburg publishes the Focus series on Africa, Asia, Latin America, 
the Middle East and global issues. The GIGA Focus is edited and published by the GIGA. 
The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the institute. Authors alone are responsible for the content of their articles. 
GIGA and the authors cannot be held liable for any errors and omissions, or for any con-
sequences arising from the use of the information provided.
General Editor GIGA Focus Series: Prof. Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach 
Editor GIGA Focus Asia: Prof. Dr. Heike Holbig
Editorial Department: Dr. James Powell, Christine Berg 
 
GIGA | Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 
20354 Hamburg 
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus  
giga-focus@giga-hamburg.de
